

INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE IN INTERNATIONAL ARCTIC GOVERNANCE REGIMES

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DECLARATION

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. This dissertation is no more than 20,000 words in length excluding the declaration, acknowledgements, list of references, tables, captions and appendices.

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

In contrast to the rising tide of alarmist news articles warning the world about potential clashes between the Arctic countries, this paper is not about conflict nor is it exclusively focused on nation-states. This project explores some of the international cooperation that is occurring in the Arctic, and pays special attention to the role of indigenous peoples in this cooperation. Perhaps a less sensationalistic angle than the stories in the popular press, but probably more important if we want to come up with constructive ideas for maintaining effective and legitimate cooperation in the future. However, that is not to say that the forthcoming academic study is without the dramatic features of tension, power struggles, and uncertainty. In the following thesis, I will use the lens of international regime theory to analyze the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council. Through this analysis, I aim to reveal the power of this discourse and its relationship to the social practices, including the agency of both indigenous and non-indigenous actors, surrounding the cooperation taking place under the Arctic Council. Indeed, I would argue that this analysis presents an example of some of the most remarkable, albeit nuanced, elements of contemporary Arctic politics.

International Regimes

The overarching framework in this thesis is the use of international regime theory as the basis for understanding international cooperation in the Arctic. First introduced as an area of research in the mid 1970s, and largely solidified in Stephen Krasner's now classic edited volume titled *International Regimes* (1983), the concept stemmed from a need to explain and analyze increasingly common supranational forms of cooperation. Regimes are defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner, 1982, p. 186). In other words, regimes consist of the "rules of the game agreed upon by actors in the international arena (usually nation states)" as well as delimit "the range of legitimate or admissible behaviour in a specified context of activity" (Rittberger, 1993, p. xii). Regimes are thus a type of *social institution*, which are "sets of rules of conventions (both formal and informal) that define a social practice, assign roles to individual participants in the practice, and guide interactions among the occupants of these roles" (Young, 1994, p. 26). More specifically, regimes fall under the category of *governance system*, defined as "an institution

that specializes in making collective choices on matters of common concern to the members of a distinct social group” (Young, 1994, p. 26). The distinction that sets regimes apart from other types of governance systems is that it is “intended to deal with a more limited set of issues or a single issue area” (Young, 1994, p. 26). Within a regime, the key elements that are typically distinguished for analysis are *principles* defined as beliefs of fact, cause, and right, *norms* defined as the standards of behavior, *rules* that tell the actors what to do or not to do under specific conditions, and *decision-making procedures* which refer to practice and implementation (Rittberger, 1993). Finally, there is a significant difference that needs to be understood between institutions as defined above and *organizations*, which “are material entities possessing budgets, personnel, offices, equipment, and legal personality” (Young, 1994, p. 26).

According to the definition of an international regime as outlined above, one can identify several international cooperation schemes in the Arctic region that could be considered regimes. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) is a cooperative group whose members consist of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the European Commission. BEAC was established in 1993, in conjunction with the interregional Barents Regional Council (BRC), with the overall objective of close cooperation towards the goal of sustainable development ("Barents Euro-Arctic Council official website," 2011). Similarly, under the banner of the Nordic Council cooperation occurs between the countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden along with the autonomous territories of the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Åland. The Nordic Council was formed in 1952, and it “works toward joint Nordic solutions that have tangible, positive effects – known as Nordic synergies – for the citizens of the individual Nordic countries” ("Norden.org the Website of Official Nordic Co-operation," 2011). In addition to these broad-spectrum cooperative governance initiatives, there also exist some specific, legally-binding bilateral and multilateral agreements covering the Arctic region, such as the 1911 North Pacific Seal Fur Convention, the 1920 Svalbard treaty, and the 1973 polar bear agreement, that are classified as international regimes by some scholars (i.e. in Young & Osherenko, 1993).

However, for the purposes of this paper I will focus on perhaps the best known and most broad international governance regime for the region, the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council is a cooperative institution whose members include all of the eight Arctic States: The United States of America, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. The Arctic Council (AC) was officially initiated in 1996 with the “Ottawa

Declaration”. However, this international cooperation directly stemmed from the work of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), which began in 1991 with the “Rovaniemi Declaration”. The AEPS was a commitment on the part of the eight Arctic states, in collaboration with indigenous Arctic inhabitants, to cooperate to address environmental issues (Bloom, 1999, p. 713). As the AEPS grew into the Arctic Council in 1996, it broadened its focus to include sustainable development as well as environmental protection, and formalized the role of indigenous groups with the creation of a “Permanent Participant” category. However, as a “high level forum” rather than a legally binding commitment on the part of the members, the Council maintained the character of a voluntary cooperation scheme that has political, but not legal, authority¹.

The Arctic Council originally recognized three indigenous groups as Permanent Participants in the *Ottawa Declaration*: the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), the Saami Council, and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON). It has since recognized three more: the Aleut International Association (AIA), the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), and the Gwich’in Council International (GCI). The position of Permanent Participant in the Council remains open to other indigenous organizations representing either “a single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic State” or “more than one arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic State” (*Ottawa Declaration* 1996). Permanent Participants have more power than observers, the category under which all other interested parties including non-Arctic states, inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are classified. Permanent Participants, although they do not have the right to vote in the consensus decision-making process, participate fully in all activities and meetings of the council with representatives sitting alongside the Ministers and Senior Arctic Officials of the member nations. Furthermore, they have the right to present their own proposals for cooperative activities, and must be fully consulted by the member states before any final decision is made (Bloom, 1999, p. 716). The conditions surrounding the creation of the Arctic Council and the participation of indigenous peoples in this international institution will be discussed in more detail in chapter three.

There are several reasons why I chose to focus only on the Arctic Council for this

¹ During the most recent meeting of the Arctic Council in May 2011, the member states did in fact sign the first legally binding agreement to come out of the activities of the regime, which was the Search and Rescue Treaty. The potential impact on the regime of this movement towards more formal cooperation is discussed in further detail in chapter four.

project. Of course, one major reason is that the scope of a short project such as this is necessarily limited. Certainly given more time it would be interesting and informative to expand my analysis to the other international governance regimes in the Arctic region. However, in choosing a regime to analyze the Arctic Council stands out as exceptional in that it is the only cooperative scheme in the region that involves all eight Arctic nations. Furthermore, it allots a unique role for indigenous peoples as “Permanent Participants”. Given that I knew I wanted to analyze some aspect of indigenous peoples’ involvement in international Arctic governance, the mere structure of the Arctic Council implied that indigenous issues would be an aspect of cooperation. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the distinctive features of the Arctic Council as a regime, in particular the incomparable role of indigenous groups, means that the conclusions from this project are not easily generalizable to other international Arctic governance regimes.

It must be acknowledged that definitional issues and a lack of conceptual clarity have long plagued the study of regimes. Key criticisms include doubt about how one knows for sure when a regime is a regime, and how one justifies choosing a certain grouping of actors and constituting them as a regime for analytical purposes. Thus, lingering reservations or uncertainty regarding my decision to define the Arctic Council as an international regime may continue to trouble some readers. It is true that there is no magic formula for decisively evaluating whether or not a certain set of cooperative activities among particular actors constitutes a regime. Moreover, precisely how and why the formation and operation of regimes occurs, when defined as such, is a much-debated area of scholarship filled with competing theories (i.e. see Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997). Nevertheless, while some aspects of international regime theory remain fuzzy or unresolved, there seems to be a general consensus that the concept grapples with something important- namely, international cooperation, which is perhaps the central issue for contemporary international relations.

It does seem clear that cooperation under the Arctic Council fulfills the delineated criteria for a regime as a collaborative social institution with a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. International regime theory is especially useful in this case study because it allows one to take into account the unique place of indigenous peoples of the Arctic in cooperation. Viewing international cooperation under the Arctic Council as a regime helps to reframe conventional international relations questions about the individual actions of nation-states in an anarchical world to more productive paths of inquiry about the intersubjective, multimodal, and social nature of global governance. International regime

theory provides a basis for looking past the intense focus on nation-states, and in particular the qualities of power and self-interest, that characterize the bulk of traditional realist and neo-liberal international relations theory. Instead, it puts a focus on the social relationships between actors who cooperate towards common ends in a particular issue area, in this case the governance of the Arctic. Furthermore, the important aspect of international regime theory for this paper is not defining the formation or existence of a regime, but rather using international regime theory as a lens through which to understand the political and social dynamics of cooperation.

An added advantage of regime theory is that as an analytical pursuit to explain the phenomenon of international cooperation it produces information about the process of cooperation between actors, which can then be taken up by actors themselves as pragmatic knowledge to inform their actions in regimes. This is not to claim that this theory provides an objective or value-free way of ordering and structuring perceptions – on the contrary, it is inherently based on certain ontological assumptions that underlie the study of international relations and Western academia in general. Nonetheless, both indigenous and non-indigenous actors can potentially learn about the dynamics of cooperation as seen through regime theory and adjust their behavior accordingly to try to achieve desired outcomes. However, for indigenous peoples to accept international regime theory as the basis for interpretation of the global system, and thus as a guide for action, may present a fundamental clash with the ontology of their traditional worldviews. In other words, while concepts in international relations like regime theory may possess apparent utility, one must keep in mind that they are by no means the only way of organizing, understanding, and explaining the world. Despite this, I would nevertheless assert that classifying the Arctic Council as a regime is a constructive theoretical approach within the field of international relations for highlighting often overlooked actors and social practices, and providing pragmatic insight on how to maintain or enhance cooperation.

Indigenous Knowledge

My interest in studying the discourse of indigenous knowledge developed through my experiences in the early stages of my research on the Arctic Council as a regime. I knew that indigenous peoples had a unique role in the Arctic Council as Permanent Participants, and I was looking to find out the ways in which this participation manifested itself in the regime. As I began to read through Arctic Council publications, the widespread use of the phrases

“indigenous knowledge” and “traditional knowledge” stood out to me. The endorsement of indigenous knowledge as a crucial component of Arctic Council activities seemed to suggest not only that indigenous peoples were key participants in the regime but also that they provided valuable insight because of a unique worldview. However, I was surprised at the lack of a clear definition or consistent terminology, which did not seem to preclude widespread use of the notion of indigenous knowledge in a variety of contexts. While I became no clearer on what exactly “indigenous knowledge” meant, it did become obvious to me that the *discourse* of indigenous knowledge had a central place in the Arctic Council regime. By analyzing this discourse, I hope to not only use it as a window onto the participation of indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council, but also as a way to understand some of the political dynamics of cooperation in the regime.

The most basic, yet perhaps most difficult, question arising from engaging with indigenous knowledge is undoubtedly “what is it?”. A deceptively simple query, debates surrounding what exactly indigenous knowledge is have continued unresolved since the concept was first used in academic scholarship, particularly anthropology and development studies, in the 1960s². The problem of defining “indigenous knowledge” (IK), or any of its various iterations such as “traditional knowledge” (TK), “traditional ecological knowledge” (TEK), “indigenous technical knowledge” (ITK), or “local environmental knowledge”, is not the chief concern of this paper. I will use the phrase “indigenous knowledge” throughout this paper as an encompassing term for all of the various names and definitions that the basic concept has accrued. In brief summary, indigenous knowledge most often refers to “local *environmental* knowledge (knowledge of plants, animals, soils and other natural components) with practical applications” although it is variously seen to also encompass technical skills, environmental philosophies, and broader world views (Ellen & Harris, 2000). Menzies and Butler present a list of attributes that typically describe TEK including: “cumulative and long-term, dynamic, historical, local, holistic, embedded, and moral and spiritual” (2006, p. 7). However, on the whole, the opinions of ‘experts’ on IK “diverge rather widely in regards to the definition, epistemology, methodology, separation from global science, codification, contextualization, sustainability, contemporary importance, jurisprudence, and rhetorical representation of IK” (Zent, 2009).

The growing recognition of indigenous knowledge as a key aspect of development,

² It should be noted that “indigenous knowledge” is indeed a Western-created concept used to describe and label something that nevertheless existed before it was given a name.

and consequently governance, has been attributed to a number of historical forces. When indigenous knowledge was first championed in the 1960s, this was in part driven by romanticism in anthropology that sees indigenous peoples as in harmony with nature. Coupled with the increasing discontent with the modernist projects of science and technology, the utilization of indigenous knowledge was seen as a more holistic, and more sustainable, way forward for development projects (Ellen & Harris, 2000, p. 12). The “crisis of representation” in Western science that emphasized how all knowledge was fragmented, ephemeral, and to some extent socio-culturally influenced, further led to a questioning of the authority of “truth” and the power relationship between Western science and other ways of knowing (Alexiades, 2009, p. 79). Furthermore, at that time there was significant change occurring in the paradigms structuring development from a “modernization” approach that stressed the transfer of technology and treated the poor as victims, to a more bottom-up “participatory” approach (Sillitoe, 2002, p. 3). Particularly in the areas of conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, the so-called “farmer-first” approach stressed empowerment of local people and community involvement in development projects (Ellen & Harris, 2000, p. 13). The utilization and integration of traditional and local knowledge in development plans, which was touted as both enhancing sustainability and involving indigenous people in a meaningful way, thus became a tool for pursuing this development ideal (Posey, 2000). Alexiades also argues that the “transformation in the nature and organization of global capitalism”, which emphasized decentralization and diversity, and took the form of a highly interconnected knowledge and service economy, underlay the increased validation of indigenous knowledge in an international context.

Although this thesis is not primarily concerned with the nature of knowledge itself, it is worth noting that the discourse of indigenous knowledge does garner some of its power particularly because it is about *knowledge*. As Michel Foucault has famously emphasized in his work, knowledge can function as a form of power and can disseminate the effects of power (i.e. Foucault & Gordon, 1980). Similarly, Joseph Rouse has done extensive work revealing how knowledge and power are inextricably connected (Rouse, 1987). Hence, in the context of traditional ecological knowledge “the pursuit of knowledge is central to the political act of controlling nature....the claims to superior knowledge are key to legitimizing claims to control natural resources” (Baviskar, 2000, p. 115). In one sense, then, it is possible that the actors that are considered to have possession of the “best” knowledge about something will hold power through that. However, many scholars have pointed out that with

indigenous knowledge the “actual indigeneity or even validity of knowledge is in many cases less important than the authority and authenticity that is publicly accorded it” (Dove, 2000, p. 215). Thus, I would argue that it is more important that we focus on the power that is accorded to indigenous knowledge as discourse rather than the power it holds as knowledge.

Discourse Analysis

The methodological basis of this dissertation lies in the practice of *critical discourse analysis* (CDA) as conceptualized by Norman Fairclough (i.e. 1989, 1992, 2010). Critical discourse analysis, as defined by both Fairclough as well as other scholars who also embrace CDA but use slightly different theoretical and methodological paradigms (cf. Wodak & Meyer, 2009), is essentially concerned with “the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures” (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000, p. 146). In CDA, “discourse” is understood as a form of social behavior and interaction. As summarized by Alba-Juez, Fairclough defines discourse as a three-dimensional concept that includes texts- “the objects of linguistic analysis”, discourse practices - “the production, distribution, and consumption of texts”, and social practices - “the power relations, ideologies and hegemonic struggles that discourses reproduce, challenge or restructure” (2009, p. 237). Discourse is conceived of as dialectically related to society and culture; in other words, language is socially and culturally constitutive but also socially and culturally determined. This emphasis on the dialectical nature of discourse is paired with a central focus on social relations, based on the assertion that “discourse brings meaning and making meaning into the complex relations of social life” (Fairclough, 2010). Thus, CDA has a unique transdisciplinary quality that systematically highlights the relationships between a discourse and other objects, moments, or elements of social process.

More specifically, CDA is concerned with “the ways discourse structures enact or reproduce relations of power and dominance in society” (Alba-Juez, 2009, p. 238). This includes a recognition of both power in discourse and power over discourse, as well as acknowledgement that language use may be ideological (Titscher et al., 2000). Power in the context of CDA refers to social power, defined as the ability of one social group to control the acts and minds of members of other social groups (Alba-Juez, 2009, p. 240). Language, ideology, and power are closely connected in CDA. On the one hand, ideologies are seen as mental representations that form the basis of discourse through their role in the construction of social cognition, defined as “the shared knowledge and attitudes of a group” (Van Dijk,

1997, p. 29 as cited in Alba-Juez, 2009, p. 249). Conversely, but simultaneously, discourses are identified as influencing mental representations, therefore potentially influencing social cognition in ways that reproduce or enact dominance.

CDA is therefore both interpretative and explanatory. That is, through analyzing discourse as a dialectical relationship between concrete language and wider historical, cultural, and social structures, it attempts to both interpret discourse in reference to a wide context and explain the relationship between discourse and social process. Furthermore, CDA is unabashedly politically involved research that tries to address social problems. This normative element of CDA, that any research involving its use must necessarily address discursive aspects of social wrongs and propose possible ways of righting or mitigating them, requires that its users seek to have an effect on social practice and social relationships (Fairclough, 2010). The precondition of practical relevance has predictably resulted in the bulk of CDA guided research investigating areas where there are obvious or expected power inequalities based on class, race, gender, ethnicity, etc.

However, CDA is *not* just general commentary on discourse but lies firmly based on a systematic analysis of text. The methodology of critical discourse analysis as developed by Fairclough has three main components, which align with the three dimensions of discourse. At the textual level, a systematic analysis of content and form and a description of linguistic properties is the basis of any research using CDA. The second step is interpretation through a focus on the process of *discursive practice*. Discursive practice is defined as the relationship between text production and text interpretation of participants in an interaction, with particular emphasis on the socio-cognitive aspects of the productive and interpretive processes. Finally, the third step is an explanation of the discourse as a part of wider social practices, for example the cultural, historical, political, or social context. This involves explaining the relationship between discursive and social practice, and often highlights power and ideologies as they connect with discourses. An important aspect of CDA is that the results that it achieves are never seen as absolute or incontrovertible; rather, it is always open to new information and contexts that might alter interpretations or explanations.

Like other methods of discourse analysis, CDA is not without its criticisms. Major concerns center on the clear ideological basis of CDA. First, there is the criticism that CDA is prejudiced on the basis of its neo-Marxist ideological commitment to social emancipation, and therefore that it is far too dependent on interpretation rather than true unbiased analysis. Proponents of CDA counter these concerns by pointing out that CDA is completely

transparent about its ideological commitments, and that the fundamental focus on text grounds analysis. Another concern of critics is that the ideological basis of CDA creates the possibility that interpretations and explanations do not ultimately “bind” to the data analyzed – in other words, that it may not reflect the local understanding of the actors in an interaction (Titscher et al., 2000, p. 163). While this is a serious concern, choosing topics of research where discourse clearly reflects an ideology, as with my choice of focus on traditional knowledge, helps mitigate this potential weakness. Lastly, some scholars have commented that CDA is too focused on negative forces of domination, and should also strive to point out discourses that are related to constructive social action. While Martin has argued for a new perspective called “positive discourse analysis” that focuses on discourses that are productive in alleviating perceived social problems (Martin & Rose, 2003), Fairclough contends that there is room within CDA for both negative and positive critique (Fairclough, 2010, p. 7). In this dissertation, I will allow space for both positive and negative critique of the discourse of indigenous knowledge and the various ways that it can be interpreted as both limiting and enabling the social power of indigenous peoples in the international Arctic governance regime of the Arctic Council.

The way that I am going to use Critical Discourse Analysis in this dissertation is by applying its methodology as the means to pursue my predetermined examination of indigenous knowledge in international Arctic governance regimes. Thus, I am explicitly choosing to engage with the concept of “indigenous knowledge” as a *discourse*, rather than as an alternative epistemology. In other words, I am focusing on the use, function, value and power of the *discourse* of indigenous knowledge, rather than indigenous knowledge itself. While my research necessarily requires a discussion of the continuing debates regarding indigenous knowledge as epistemology, particularly in terms of how ongoing ambiguity and disagreement about the definition and utility of indigenous knowledge ultimately impact its expression as a discourse, I do not intend to evaluate its underlying nature. It should also be clear that I have decided to take the approach of initially choosing a specific discourse to analyze rather than using a method of discourse analysis, for example grounded theory, as the means for deciding which discourses warrant attention in my research of the governance regime of the Arctic Council. While I fully acknowledge that this means I am not paying attention to the many other important discourses that run through the work of the Arctic Council, and undoubtedly influence the operation of this Arctic governance regime, that is not the objective of this project. Hence, the choice to use critical discourse analysis is

advantageous in that its central goal is not primarily the identification of significant discourses in certain contexts, but rather the interpretation and explanation of the relationships between discourse and social practices.

My choice of discourse analysis as a methodology for understanding indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council regime has both benefits and limitations. On the one hand, because regimes are intersubjective social institutions that are often difficult to describe in the usual positivistic manner of international relations, the discourses that they produce are potentially important indicators of their principles and norms. Furthermore, because the Arctic Council is built upon political and social authority, it is the general discourse of the regime, rather than binding law, that both embodies the mutually agreed upon areas of cooperation as well as guides the actions of the members of the regime. Studying discourse often reveals more about the actors and contexts surrounding the discourse rather than the subject of the discourse itself, the former being the objective of this thesis. At the same time, one must be wary of some of the limitations of discourse analysis, particularly in the context of regimes. Discourse analysis is only one way of gaining insight into social practices, and therefore the conclusions stemming from the analysis put forth in this thesis are neither absolute nor irrefutable. Moreover, understanding the origins of discourse within a regime is particularly tricky. Even if a certain discourse can be identified as prominent within a regime, it may or may not truly embody the viewpoints of all actors within that regime; given that cooperation involves bargaining and compromise guided by power and interests, so too can the discourse produced by regimes be guided by these forces. Thus, one must pay attention to both the power of and power over discourse as crucial to its relationship with social practices.

Given that in framing my research I define the Arctic Council as a regime, that is, as a *social institution* for cooperation, CDA is a very fitting methodology for making connections between the discourse of indigenous knowledge and international governance under the Arctic Council as seen through the lens of regime theory. Accepting the premises of CDA, we can theorize that the discourse of indigenous knowledge and the Arctic Council regime, seen as a set of social practices, have a dialectical relationship. In other words, we can interpret and analyze both how the Arctic Council regime determines the features of the discourse of indigenous knowledge, as well as the impact of the discourse of indigenous knowledge on the Arctic Council regime. Additionally, the requirement for practical relevance to address social inequalities that CDA research embodies fits well with the

potential pragmatic applications of regime theory for international cooperation. In both cases, the ultimate goal is that the understanding gained from the use of these intellectual tools can guide actors in reality to ideal social practices, however that may be defined in a given context.

Choice of Materials

Apart from the theoretical and methodological bases of this dissertation, the research that follows was additionally delimited by the decisions that I made about what materials to analyze. Ultimately, I chose to analyze two groups of written documents produced by the international regime now operating under the Arctic Council – the set of twelve declarations resulting from ministerial meetings of the regime, and the three different versions of “Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines” created by the working groups of the Arctic Council and endorsed at the ministerial meetings. My choices about the materials for analysis in this dissertation had theoretical, methodological, as well as practical reasons, and I openly acknowledge that these choices inevitably have both positive and negative impacts on this project.

My decision to analyze publicly available, formally released texts of the Arctic Council stems from various forces. Not only did the easy accessibility of the texts I chose to analyze facilitate my data collection as a researcher, but also the fact that these texts were readily accessible signaled that they were a part of the public expression of the Arctic Council regime. International regimes, as mentioned above, are a concept for categorizing social institutions for cooperation that are based on an intersubjective process of agreement. As a social institution, it can be difficult, if not outright impossible, to capture the nature of any given regime through traditional forms of empirical “proof” or “evidence” of how the regime functions. While one approach to this project could have been an anthropological or sociological based study reliant on techniques like observation and interviews, I chose instead to focus on formal published documents as a window onto the social processes behind the regime. Wary that these formal written documents may conceal many aspects of the social processes behind the regime, I would nonetheless argue that as a concrete indication of the agreed upon norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures they provide a useful means for systematically evaluating discourse and the role of discourse in cooperation. Given more time and resources, an expansion of this project beyond textual analysis would certainly make for a richer analysis.

My decision to analyze written texts also partially stems from my methodological choice of critical discourse analysis. Norman Fairclough, the key theorist in the specific strain of CDA that I have chosen to use, supports the particular utility of textual analysis with four main justifications (as summarized in Titscher et al., 2000, p. 152). First, from a theoretical standpoint he argues that texts can be seen as a form of social activity that play a significant role in social life. Methodologically, he points to the increasing use of texts as data as a general trend across disciplines. Furthermore, Fairclough points out that as a concrete form of historical documentation texts can provide evidence of social processes and indications of social change, and are already regularly used to do so in academic practice. Finally, Fairclough argues that texts are manifestly, and increasingly, used to exercise social control and power as an element of politics, and thus are an important focus for critical discourse analysis. Unfortunately, when only focusing on formal texts produced by a regime it is not necessarily possible to trace the exact social process by which a certain discourse becomes important. However, I will attempt to mitigate this difficulty by connecting the discourse of indigenous knowledge with the general context of discursive practices and relevant socio-historical circumstances of the Arctic Council in order to at least make generalizations about the social process behind the discourse.

Practically speaking, the limited amount of time for research and the limited space for writing dictated that I had to focus in on a few select documents for thorough analysis. I chose the Declarations of the Arctic Council because they are the written statements produced at the highest level of the Arctic Council, the ministerial meetings, and also provide the most general embodiment of the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of the regime. As a further case study, I chose the “Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines” as an example of a specific issue-area in which the regime coordinates cooperation. These Guidelines were chosen because they provide a particularly interesting context within which to look at the discourse of indigenous knowledge. Offshore oil and gas development, seemingly outside the boundaries of both the traditional physical territory of indigenous peoples as well as their traditional knowledge based on their own resource use, is not an area in which indigenous knowledge would appear automatically relevant. Thus, looking at the entrenched discourse of indigenous knowledge as found in these Guidelines can reveal quite a bit about the political aspects of the discourse in the overall cooperative regime.

It is necessary here to point out one final constraint of this project in general. Although I am not directly researching indigenous knowledge, but rather the discourse of

indigenous knowledge, something must be said about the fundamental incongruity of the inherently Western perspectives put forth in this paper with the subject at hand. As a non-indigenous person working within the context of a Western academic institution, the validity and legitimacy of this thesis is in fact reliant on Western conceptions of “scientific knowledge” and the related practices. I am aware that I myself draw on an underlying epistemological framework that may clash with the worldview embodied in the subject of the discourse that I am attempting to investigate. While this is an insurmountable fact of my own identity as a researcher, I do not suggest that it invalidates the work, for the research satisfies the criteria of the epistemological basis that I am choosing to use. However, as I have explored a discourse about alternative “ways of knowing” through this project, I have become self-consciously aware that my research is perhaps not the only possible way that one could go about “knowing” this topic.

Outline of Chapters

Following this introduction, chapter two presents the first level of discourse analysis, which is the textual analysis of indigenous knowledge as used in the documents I have chosen to study. This chapter follows the discursive development of “indigenous knowledge” through both the Declarations of the Arctic Council and its precedent cooperative institution, as well as through the three versions of the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines endorsed by the Arctic Council. Through this textual analysis certain features of the discourse of indigenous knowledge as a part of the international regime become clear, including both its power and its limitations. Chapter three then broadens the discourse analysis by connecting the text with a discussion of the discursive practices and the wider social and historical context within the framework of the Arctic Council Regime. This chapter explores the ways in which the discourse of indigenous knowledge has both influenced and been influenced by the Arctic Council regime, and highlights the role that this discourse plays in international cooperation. The fourth and concluding chapter, beyond merely summarizing what the discourse analysis of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council regime reveals, uses the findings of the analysis to make practical suggestions. Ultimately, the importance of this project lies in the potential that actors in the Arctic Council, both indigenous and non-indigenous, could learn from the findings to guide their behavior within the regime to shape effective and just cooperation.

CHAPTER 2: Textual Analysis

To reiterate what was stated in the introduction, what is striking about the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council regime is that it appears to play a significant role in unexpected contexts - as the reader will see through my case study of the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines. The goal of this chapter is to highlight some of the significant features of the discourse of indigenous knowledge through textual analysis as a first step in understanding the role that it plays in the Arctic Council regime. However, before turning to the specific case study of the Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines, it is important to understand the discursive construction of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council in general. For this, it is valuable to first look at the highest-level declarations issued by the regime and trace the shifting formations and implications of this discourse. Every ministerial meeting of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, and subsequently the Arctic Council, has released a Declaration that ostensibly expresses some of the key norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures of the regime. As the output of an international regime with a diverse mix of nation-states, indigenous peoples, and other interested groups involved, these declarations are the outcome of a complex process of strategic bargaining, framing, negotiation, and consensus building (Young, 1998). While the final texts of the declarations thus on the one hand may belie complex underlying social process, at the same time they also reveal the power of certain discourses in gaining inclusion.

AEPS/AC Declarations

In order to trace the discourse of indigenous knowledge through the declarations of the AEPS and AC, I have created a table that highlights the key quotes regarding indigenous knowledge from each of the declarations from the ministerial meetings of the AEPS and AC (**Table 1**). The creation of this table entailed the analysis of each the twelve declarations, ranging from the years 1991 to 2011, and the extraction of all of the references to indigenous, traditional, or local knowledge³. The contents of this table are the basis for the analysis of the discourse of indigenous knowledge that follows. The reader is therefore encouraged to refer back to this table to connect my discussion of the principle features of the discourse of

³ In the cases where there were no mentions of indigenous knowledge, which was true in both the Rovaniemi Declaration and the Barrow declaration, other seemingly relevant quotes were chosen in lieu of direct references.

Table 1: Text regarding indigenous knowledge in AEPS and AC Declarations

| AEPS / ARCTIC COUNCIL MEETING | RESULTING DECLARATION | KEY QUOTES REGARDING INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE | LOCATION IN TEXT |
|---|---|--|---|
| AEPS Ministerial Meeting Rovaniemi, Finland June 1991 | Rovaniemi Declaration: Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment | <p>“recognizing the special relationship of the indigenous peoples and local populations to the Arctic and their unique contribution to the protection of the Arctic Environment”</p> <p>“Cooperation in scientific research to specify sources, indigenous peoples and to invite their organizations to future pathways, sinks and effects of pollution, in particular, oil, acidification, persistent organic contaminants, radioactivity, noise and heavy metals as well as sharing of these data”</p> | <p>page 1, paragraph 6</p> <p>pp. 1 para. 9</p> |
| AEPS Ministerial Meeting Nuuk, Greenland September 1993 | Nuuk Declaration | <p>“Further affirming Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration, which states that: ‘indigenous people and their communities have a vital role in environmental management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development.’”</p> <p>“We recognize the special role of the indigenous peoples in environmental management and development in the Arctic, and of the significance of their knowledge and traditional practices, and will promote their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development in the Arctic.”</p> | <p>pp. 1, para. 9</p> <p>pp. 2, number 7</p> |
| AEPS Ministerial Meeting Inuvik, Canada March 1996 | Inuvik Declaration | <p>“We note with satisfaction the establishment of the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat and the support it has given to the AEPS Permanent Participants to facilitate their participation in the AEPS. We further note the success of the Seminar on Integration of Indigenous Peoples' Knowledge held in Iceland, and its useful recommendations, and express our thanks to the governments of Denmark and Iceland for moving forward this major component of the AEPS.”</p> <p>“We recognize and affirm the right of all Arctic indigenous peoples to be represented in the AEPS. We acknowledge the contributions of the AEPS Permanent Participants, and encourage them and other indigenous peoples' organizations to participate actively in the work of the AEPS. We emphasize the importance of indigenous peoples and their knowledge to the AEPS and its programmes.”</p> | <p>pp. 4, number 7</p> <p>pp. 4, number 8</p> |

(Table 1: Continued)

| | | | |
|---|---|--|--|
| Meeting of the Arctic States Ottawa, Canada September 1996 | Ottawa Declaration: Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council | “Recognizing the traditional knowledge of the indigenous people of the Arctic and their communities and taking note of its importance and that of Arctic science and research to the collective understanding of the circumpolar Arctic” | pp. 2, para. 6 |
| AEPS Ministerial Meeting Alta, Norway June 1997 | Alta Declaration | “We encourage continued input and participation of the Permanent Participants in the AEPS programmes, including indigenous peoples' traditional knowledge, as essential to sustainable development, including the use of natural resources and effective environmental protection of the Arctic” “We recommend that sustainable development, including environmental protection strategies, scientific advice and traditional knowledge, be an overriding objective for all activities under the Arctic Council.” | pp. 2, number 6 pp. 4, number 12 |
| First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council Iqaluit, Canada September 1998 | Iqaluit Declaration | “Encourage the Sustainable Development Working Group to take special note of proposals which reflect the importance of traditional and indigenous knowledge and the perspectives of indigenous communities in developing a sustainable future for the Arctic” | pp. 2, number 10 |
| Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council Barrow, Alaska October 2000 | Barrow Declaration | “Emphasizing the essential role played by Arctic communities and Arctic indigenous inhabitants in all aspects of the future of the Arctic” | pp. 1, para. 4 |
| Third Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council Inari, Finland October 2002 | Inari Declaration | “welcome with appreciation the good progress of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA)...note the methodology of incorporating indigenous knowledge and perspectives into the Assessment;” “approve as a priority project under Iceland’s lead, the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) to be developed into a comprehensive knowledge base for the Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development Programme and request that traditional knowledge be fully used in this report;” “recognize that enhanced monitoring of biodiversity at the circumpolar level, fully utilizing traditional knowledge, is required to detect the impacts of global changes on biodiversity and to enable Arctic communities to effectively respond and adapt to these changes;” | pp. 2, para. 1 pp. 4, para. 4 pp. 4, para. 11 |

(Table 1: Continued)

| | | | |
|--|--------------------------|--|--|
| Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council Reykjavík, Iceland November 2004 | Reykjavík Declaration | <p>“Welcome the continuing contribution of indigenous and traditional knowledge to research in the Arctic”</p> <p>“Support the continued cooperation with indigenous peoples of the Arctic, the use of their traditional knowledge of flora and fauna, and efforts toward community-based monitoring of the Arctic’s living resources”</p> | <p>pp. 2, para. 2</p> <p>pp. 6, para. 5</p> |
| Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council Salekhard, Russia October 2006 | Salekhard Declaration | <p>“Welcoming the continuing contribution of indigenous and traditional knowledge to research and culture in the Arctic”</p> <p>“Request the SAOs and the Arctic Council working groups to continue supporting, analyzing and synthesizing Arctic climate research, including the gathering and compilation of indigenous and local knowledge of the effects of climate change, so that the exchange of expertise at the global level through the IPCC can better reflect unique Arctic conditions and that global decision-making can take Arctic needs into account”</p> <p>“Support the inclusion of programs initiated by Arctic residents, the effective involvement of Arctic indigenous peoples in IPY activities and recognize that their traditional and indigenous knowledge is an invaluable component of IPY research.”</p> <p>“Urge Member States and other entities to strengthen monitoring and research efforts needed to comprehensively address Arctic change and to promote the establishment of a circumpolar Arctic observing network of monitoring stations with coordinated data handling and information exchange for scientific data, statistics and traditional knowledge as a lasting legacy of the IPY (and as the evolving Arctic component of the Global Earth Observing System of Systems, GEOSS)”</p> <p>“Support the continued cooperation with indigenous peoples of the Arctic, welcome the contribution of their traditional knowledge of flora and fauna to the scientific research, and encourage further cooperation in the development of community-based monitoring of the Arctic’s living resources”</p> | <p>pp. 1, para. 12</p> <p>pp. 2, para. 6</p> <p>pp. 3, para. 6</p> <p>pp. 3, para. 8</p> <p>pp. 7, para. 3</p> |

(Table 1: Continued)

| | | | |
|---|-------------------------------|---|---|
| <p>Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council Tromsø, Norway April 2009</p> | <p>Tromsø Declaration</p> | <p>“Acknowledge that indigenous peoples in the Arctic are taking a leading role to use best available traditional and scientific knowledge to help understand and adapt to challenges related to climate change and other challenges in their societies, and welcome initiatives to build the capacity of indigenous peoples”</p> <p>“Encourage the exploration of ways to continue the innovative forms for IPY outreach and the presentation of outcomes of the IPY, including the use of scientific data and traditional knowledge in future assessments”</p> <p>“Recognize that education, outreach, scientific research, traditional knowledge and capacity building are major tools to address challenges in Arctic communities and recommend that, where relevant, Arctic Council projects include these elements”</p> <p>“Emphasize the important role of Arctic indigenous peoples and their traditional knowledge in conservation and sustainable use of Arctic biological resources”</p> | <p>pp. 3, para. 5</p> <p>pp. 4, para. 5</p> <p>pp. 6, para. 1</p> <p>pp. 8, para. 2</p> |
| <p>Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council Nuuk, Greenland May 2011</p> | <p>Nuuk Declaration</p> | <p>“Reiterate the importance of the use of Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ traditional knowledge and capacity-building initiatives in the planning and implementation of measures to adapt to climate change”</p> <p>“Congratulate the University of the Arctic (UArctic) on its 10th anniversary, recognize its contribution in developing specialized education aimed at building capacity and fostering traditional and scientific knowledge relevant to Indigenous Peoples, Arctic communities and policy-makers, and encourage continuous support for the UArctic”</p> | <p>pp. 3, para. 7</p> <p>pp. 5, para. 6</p> |

indigenous knowledge, as well as the continuities and changes through time, to the actual text of the Declarations.

Although in the Rovaniemi Declaration of 1991 that established the AEPS there were no statements explicitly made about traditional or indigenous knowledge, there were some sentences that hinted at related ideas. While the recognition of a “special relationship” could on the one hand be interpreted as a nod towards alternative ways of understanding and knowing the Arctic, the equal mention given to local populations implies that this “special relationship” is more geographically anchored than epistemologically based. Similarly, because indigenous and local populations are grouped together as sharing a “unique contribution” to environmental protection, this again appears to reference connection with place rather than cultural experience as the primary source of helpful contributions. Further along in the declaration, there is another (unfortunately somewhat incomprehensible) statement that appears to call for cooperation with indigenous peoples in the identification of sources of pollution. This implies that their involvement will contribute to the overall available information and thus enhance the expertise of the AEPS programs dealing with pollution. These discursive formations serve as the primer for the appearance of the discourse of indigenous knowledge in subsequent declarations.

By the second declaration of the AEPS, indigenous peoples do become explicitly linked with knowledge, although still not yet with the exact label of “indigenous knowledge” or “traditional knowledge”. This declaration references the precedent of the Rio Declaration, which was one of the first international declarations to point to the knowledge of indigenous peoples as distinctive and recommend its utilization as a part of programs for environmental protection. The fact that the discourse from one international regime was directly taken up by another international regime reveals how discourse is not only reflective of the situation in which it was produced, but is also influenced by a wider social context. The phrasing “indigenous peoples...and their knowledge” that is found in both textual references to indigenous knowledge is a particular wording that has certain implications. Unlike the terms “indigenous knowledge” or “traditional knowledge” that begin to appear in later declarations, in this declaration the word “knowledge” is not yet directly modified by an adjective. Thus, what constitutes the body of knowledge of indigenous people(s) remains open-ended, rather than explicitly bounded by a classification as a type of knowledge in contrast to other types of knowledge (i.e. “Western” or “scientific”). Also important to note is the connection drawn in both statements between the knowledge of indigenous people(s) and the importance of

supporting effective participation. The “vital” and “special” role that indigenous peoples are designated as having, which is in turn the justification for the need to support their participation in cooperation, is explicitly linked with the significance of their “knowledge” and “traditional practices”. This is in contrast to the Rovaniemi declaration in which their “special relationship” was connected to place.

Both the establishment of an Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat as well as the Seminar on Integration of Indigenous Peoples’ Knowledge, which occurred between the Nuuk and Inuvik AEPS meetings, further propelled indigenous knowledge into the regime. From the statement about these events in the Inuvik Declaration we see that the goals of effective participation of indigenous peoples’ groups in the regime and “integration” of their knowledge are again connected as a single component of the regime. It is notable that two members of the regime in particular are singled out as moving along these goals. On the one hand, this reveals the influence of actor leadership on regime direction and development. Additionally, it reflects the possibility that within regimes cooperation can happen not only through explicit agreement and cooperation, but also through indifference or non-opposition to certain initiatives. On the other hand, it is significant that the actors credited for leading this initiative are *nation-states* and not indigenous peoples’ groups. This seems to signify that nation-states have a certain amount of power that enables them as the primary actors driving cooperation, even in relation to indigenous peoples’ issues. Nevertheless, representation, participation, and knowledge of indigenous people are all tied together as core components of AEPS. However, there is still a clear distinction between “we”, the members of the regime issuing the declaration (i.e. the Arctic States), and “them”, indigenous peoples as participants.

As the Arctic Council was very much intended to be an enhancement of the cooperation happening under the AEPS, it is not surprising that the discourse of indigenous knowledge remains central to the regime even in this more formal materialization. I would argue that from the Ottawa Declaration through the Reykjavík Declaration a fairly coherent discursive representation of indigenous knowledge is apparent. The 2000 Barrow Declaration does stand out here because there is absolutely no mention of traditional knowledge or indigenous knowledge in this document. On the one hand, this is a somewhat surprising omission given that the language of prior and following declarations affirm that the consideration of traditional/indigenous knowledge was a core component of the activities of the regime. While indigenous peoples are not ignored in this declaration, their contributions

are conceptualized in a rather vague manner. At the same time, there is also no mention of “scientific knowledge” in the Barrow Declaration either. The explanations for the inclusion or exclusion of certain discourses in very closely related documents are not always clear. However, given the background that “knowledge” in general was apparently not a central element of the meetings leading to the Barrow Declaration, as well as the lack of evidence that the prominent indigenous/traditional knowledge discourse was deliberately and suddenly left behind by the regime, the most probable explanation is that the IK discourse was just not seen as relevant in the context of the discussion and the consequent Declaration. Aside from this gap, there are several main features of the discourse of indigenous knowledge that are consistently represented in the Declarations from 1996 to 2004.

In the recurring endorsement of indigenous knowledge in these Declarations, we can see the traces of various common “valorizing” strategies, for example connecting indigenous knowledge to the preservation of biodiversity, or framing indigenous knowledge as more than just knowledge but rather “wisdom”, to highlight its apparent significance (Brosius, 2000, p. 299). Just as exhibited in these declarations, Indigenous and traditional knowledges were heralded more generally during this time in both the literature produced by academics and by international development institutions, including among non-indigenous and indigenous peoples alike: “Rather than an obstacle to modern development, they have been redefined as potentially valuable resources in political, social, ecological, economic and spiritual renewal” (Alexiades, 2009, p. 86). As indigenous knowledge was widely embraced in the discourse of development, its utilization became an institutionalized concept and its virtues were generally uncritically extolled (Ellen & Harris, 2000). The discourse of indigenous knowledge is formulated in a way that treats this knowledge as almost sacred or ineffable (Brosius, 2000, p. 309). Despite the lack of definition of indigenous knowledge, the Arctic Council stresses that its incorporation is imperative, and there are no criticisms or potential difficulties about the process of doing so mentioned. It would seem that this creates a dialectical process whereby the more frequently the concept of indigenous knowledge is validated in discourse, the greater legitimacy it is accorded, and in turn the more likely it is to be endorsed further in discourse.

There is a strong connection created in this discourse between indigenous knowledge and sustainable development, which we see directly in the Alta and Iqaluit Declarations. As was discussed at a 1993 “Traditional Knowledge and Sustainable Development Conference”, traditional knowledge can both be viewed as a useful “tool” in promoting “culturally

sensitive or appropriate forms of development”, as well as “play a role in the design of culturally appropriate participation mechanisms” (p.5). In this conception, traditional knowledge is seen as an enabling component of development that simultaneously achieves sustainability, cultural preservation, and indigenous empowerment. While on the surface the commitment to the integration of traditional knowledge implies that cooperation within the regime is open to, and possibly dependent on, non-Western perspectives, the qualification that traditional knowledge should be used in the service of sustainable development belies the continuing power that the ideologies of Western nation-states have in guiding the regime. That traditional knowledge is conceived of primarily as a tool to achieve sustainable development, rather than an epistemological basis for understanding the Arctic, is further underscored in the statements where it is left out: “We encourage international scientific research as necessary to expand the knowledge and understanding of the Arctic region” (Alta Declaration, pp. 2, number 7). It is non-indigenous epistemology that ultimately is accorded the most validity in providing the knowledge upon which the regime will act.

This confinement of indigenous knowledge through its relation to Western concepts is an omnipresent force in the discourse that “[narrows] the parameters of understanding [indigenous knowledge] through the imposition of western categories” (Ellen & Harris, 2000, p. 14). The Ottawa Declaration is the first time that the term “traditional knowledge” is used, and it is placed in contrast to “Arctic science and research”, setting up a dichotomy in types of knowledge. Arguably the placement of “traditional knowledge” before “Arctic science and research” in the sentence structure suggests that it has primary importance in the “collective understanding of the circumpolar Arctic”. However, the mere division of traditional knowledge as a separate category “implies the existence of some overarching comparator, what we might call ‘universal reason’ (or science) which is always ontologically privileged” (Ellen & Harris, 2000, p. 25). Moreover, the choice of the adjective “traditional” seems to imply that this knowledge system is an inert entity, frozen in time and isolated from history or outside influences (Agrawal, 1995; Dove, 2000; Sundar, 2000). The frequent pairing of “traditional knowledge” with “Arctic science and research” implies that the usefulness of indigenous knowledge is limited and must necessarily be supplemented for a true understanding of the Arctic. Thus, notwithstanding the discursive claims that indigenous knowledge holds equal weight to Western science, there is really a “mythology of difference in which complementarity (science-researcher and ITK-farmer) is created between the ideologically created entities, but in a hierarchical way (science/researcher > ITK-farmer)”

(Pottier, 1993, p. 201). In support of this assertion, it worth noting that in a joint communiqué regarding the establishment of the Arctic Council released by the ministers of the governments of the eight Arctic nations subsequent to the signing of the Ottawa Declaration, there is recognition of “the contribution of international science to the knowledge and understanding of the Arctic region”, but there is no mention whatsoever of the role of traditional knowledge.

The subjugation of indigenous knowledge to the boundaries of Western paradigms of science, governance, and development is further seen in other Declarations. In both the Reykjavík and Inari Declarations, indigenous knowledge is often brought up only within the context of research projects. Take, for example, the utility of traditional knowledge for monitoring of biodiversity suggested in the Inari Declaration, or the singling out of the importance of traditional knowledge about flora and fauna in the Reykjavík declaration. This discourse, while welcoming indigenous knowledge, does not refer to all and any aspects of the knowledge of indigenous peoples, but rather those aspects that are deemed relevant in the service of what the nation-state regime members would like to accomplish through the Arctic Council. Thus while the use of one aspect of indigenous knowledge is deemed legitimate, other aspects such as traditional shamanistic rituals, or contemporary indigenous understanding of flora and fauna, are implicitly deemed irrelevant. Although it is possible that “traditional knowledge” is used in a broad sense, the underlying fact that it is construed as a tool of the Western research programs suggests that only those elements of traditional knowledge that are usable in a Western “scientific” context are really being endorsed. The wording in the Declarations often emphasizes the positioning of indigenous knowledge as a vital stepping-stone for achieving broader goals – in this case, research projects – which in turn can positively impact the ability of indigenous peoples to thrive. As it is framed here, Indigenous knowledge thus has important value when mediated through non-indigenous mechanisms, but is not construed as having a direct impact on Arctic communities. Of further interest is the language of “incorporating”, “using”, and “utilizing” indigenous and traditional knowledge. Not only does this terminology underscore the idea that something needs to be done to indigenous knowledge to make it useful, but it also reveals the underlying power dynamics of the instrumental use of indigenous knowledge by nation-states dictated by a Western paradigm of research and governance. As Pottier puts it, “it leads us to think that the farmer [read: indigenous person] complements the scientist, and not vice versa” (Pottier, 1993, p. 201).

I would argue that it is in the Salekhard Declaration of 2006 that we begin to see a slight shift in the discourse of indigenous knowledge. While on the one hand endorsements of indigenous knowledge as a tool for scientific research projects are still clear, other parts of the Declaration suggest some changes in the way that indigenous knowledge is conceived in the Arctic Council regime. For example, nearly the same statement that was used in the Reykjavik declaration about the “continuing contribution of indigenous and traditional knowledge” is repeated, but is moved from a sub-section to the opening affirmation section of the Declaration and is tweaked in a significant way: “Welcoming the continuing contribution of indigenous and traditional knowledge to research *and culture* in the Arctic” [my emphasis added]. Thus, indigenous knowledge is seemingly accorded inherent value as part of a culture, rather than just as a research tool. That the discourse of indigenous knowledge is changing is also reflected in the way it is connected to indigenous participation. First, traditional indigenous knowledge is connected to programs *initiated* by Arctic residents, suggesting that it has value not only when filtered through Western research, but also when directly drawn upon by indigenous peoples themselves. Furthermore, I would argue that the language of “involvement”, as opposed to the term “participation” that is widely found in previous declarations, positions indigenous peoples more as equal to other actors on the playing field at the outset rather than as subservient players invited to join the game. This is echoed by the affirmation that indigenous knowledge is “invaluable”, again much stronger wording than in any previous declaration.

The Tromsø Declaration continues to exhibit these slight discursive shifts. Again, indigenous knowledge is now explicitly connected with the regime-related initiatives and activities of indigenous peoples themselves, who in turn are credited with their ability to draw upon various epistemological systems to inform their understanding of the Arctic. While the basic conviction that both traditional and scientific knowledge are useful in certain ways has been maintained throughout the Declarations of the regime, this statement could be seen as again leveling the playing field by according traditional and scientific knowledge at least equal potential importance, rather than insisting on “the incorporation” of traditional knowledge into a Western paradigm. On the other hand, the concept of using the “best available” traditional and scientific knowledge rests on a completely subjective definition of what knowledge is the “best” to draw upon in a given situation. Given other statements in the Declaration that ultimately reveal the continuing primacy of Western concepts, we can see a tension in the discourse of indigenous knowledge between instances of full

acknowledgement of it as a valid epistemological basis for understanding, and simultaneous subjection and distortion to Western ideologies. While traditional knowledge and scientific knowledge are given equal recognition numerous times as tools for understanding and addressing what's going on in the Arctic, in the end traditional knowledge is still classified as one of many instrumental tools available in the service of non-indigenous projects in the region, even if through the capacity of indigenous peoples themselves.

The Nuuk Declaration reinforces the link between the capacity of indigenous peoples and the use of their traditional knowledge that has clearly become established through the previous few declarations. It appears that the use of traditional knowledge is conceived of as manifesting through an active participatory role for indigenous peoples, signified by words like “planning” and “implementation”, as opposed to previous language like “utilization” and “recognition” which implied a more passive position. As in the Tromsø Declaration, we again see the assertion that Indigenous Peoples are drawing upon both scientific and traditional knowledge as relevant to their understanding of the Arctic. While the AEPS and AC Declarations have always implied that indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge should be used complementarily, the explicit recognition that *both* of these forms of knowledge can be drawn upon by any and all actors, but particularly indigenous people, is a new development in the discourse. On the one hand, it seems this slightly changed discourse suggests that through the increased capacity of indigenous peoples, which is taken in part to imply more social power, traditional knowledge will inevitably maintain a role in decision-making. At the same time, however, the fact that these are the only two mentions of indigenous knowledge in this most recent Declaration suggests that as indigenous peoples are increasingly acknowledged as fully capable actors able to draw upon various forms of knowledge, there is apparently less need to explicitly encourage the inclusion of indigenous knowledge as an important element of the regime.

Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines

With these features of the discourse of indigenous knowledge in mind, we now turn to the specific case study of the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines (hereafter “Guidelines”). The first set of Guidelines were developed by the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, with additional help from the Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Response (EPPR) and Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) working groups. It was commissioned

during the 1996 AEPS ministerial meeting in Inuvik, and officially adopted by the AEPS during the 1997 ministerial meeting in Alta with the following statement: “We receive with appreciation...the ‘Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines’ developed under AEPS, and agree that these Guidelines be applied”. It was further elaborated in the Guidelines document that: “The endorsement of these Guidelines recognizes a uniform understanding of the minimum actions needed to protect the Arctic marine environment from unwanted environmental effects caused by offshore oil and gas activities”. Although, of course, like all of the work done by the AEPS and the AC, these Guidelines are non-binding, they do claim through these statements to represent the principles and norms regarding all aspects of offshore oil and gas development as agreed upon by the members of the international regime under AEPS. The Arctic Council updated and endorsed the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines in both 2002 and most recently in 2009. A close textual analysis of the discourse of indigenous knowledge through all three versions of the guidelines follows below.

The first mention of indigenous knowledge is found fairly early on in the original 1996 guidelines, urging that “institutional mechanisms and capabilities are required at the local, national and regional levels to implement these guidelines...To ensure that scientific and traditional knowledge are available to the processes and are effectively used” (p. 10). In this section, it is not made explicit exactly what the effective use of traditional knowledge would entail in the context of implementing these guidelines. However, following this statement the Guidelines do urge Arctic States to “review their own needs, and regional needs, for institutional strengthening and capacity-building in these areas, and identify priority needs with schedules for addressing them” and “cooperate in and facilitate bilateral and multilateral initiatives to address the needs, in concert with civil society and with oil and gas industry operators”. Thus, there seems to be a strong connection established between “effective” use of traditional knowledge and strong institutions and capacity building. Presumably, the idea behind this is that successful institutional structures coupled with capable participation from all stakeholders, including indigenous peoples, will automatically lead to “effective” inclusion of indigenous knowledge in offshore oil and gas activities.

This link between traditional knowledge and the participation of indigenous peoples in the process of offshore oil and gas development remains strong throughout the Guidelines:

In the Arctic, public participation in scoping is necessary for efficient and full use of traditional knowledge. Sufficient time and resources to include public participation throughout the process should be included. (p. 15)

On the one hand, the wording of this statement implies that the “efficient and full use of traditional knowledge” is ultimately for the benefit of the offshore oil and gas development process, reflecting the theme of instrumental use of IK that was seen in the AEPS and AC Declarations. However, it is also clear that the possession of traditional knowledge by indigenous peoples in part justifies the allotment of time and resources to enable public participation. This is reiterated through two more direct mandates later on in the document that state:

Arctic States should: ...Incorporate indigenous and other residents, and their traditional knowledge into the decision-making process including the initial siting studies and disposition of resource use rights; ...improve cross-cultural communication methods to ensure full and meaningful participation of indigenous residents including procedures to incorporate local knowledge (p. 17-18)

Thus, while an overt explanation of *why* traditional and local knowledge is important to offshore oil and gas development and *how* to incorporate this knowledge is lacking, it is expected that Arctic States will promote the participation of indigenous residents for the purpose, among other reasons, of incorporating their traditional knowledge. Although “full and meaningful participation” is rather vague, and the participation of indigenous peoples is tied to residency in a specific area as well as equated with participation of non-indigenous local residents thus marginalizing the unique political character of “indigenous knowledge”, there is nonetheless a clear space created for indigenous participation in offshore oil and gas activities through the notion of traditional knowledge.

At the same time, one also has to be critical about where indigenous knowledge is *not* found, and the ways in which the discourse about it still reveals power relations. A section about the sources of information appropriate to use in Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) has a glaring space in a place where IK would seem to warrant a mention when it states: “Data for EIA purposes may be collected among existing data (scientific literature, database registers etc.) and necessary additional information may be obtained through baseline investigations or monitoring programs.” (p. 13). Although probably not an intentional exclusion of IK on the part of the authors of this document, I would argue that its omission reveals the greater legitimacy ultimately accorded to scientific knowledge in the Arctic Council regime on the whole. As discussed in the context of the Declarations, there are also limitations placed upon indigenous knowledge through explication in the text regarding the specific contexts in which it can be used:

Whenever appropriate, operators should consider local indigenous populations for conduct of contractual monitoring activities as well as drawing upon traditional knowledge for the identification of historical environmental extremes and trends. Establishment of cooperative relationships with resident indigenous communities for biological sample collection, environmental observation and monitoring, should be pursued. (p. 26)

Nevertheless, one must balance the conclusion that the discourse of indigenous knowledge in these documents to some extent encapsulates the dominance of Western ideologies with the equally valid conclusion that the inclusion of the concept of “traditional knowledge” at all as a prominent discourse is in itself a source of power for indigenous peoples. For example, the assertion in the Guidelines that “where appropriate, traditional knowledge should be used in training programs”, simultaneously brings to light the fact that it is legitimate for Westerners to arbitrate when and where traditional knowledge will be used, but also that there is a powerful space created for traditional knowledge, and hence indigenous people, to influence training programs associated with the offshore oil and gas industry.

In 2002, the Arctic Council adopted an updated version of the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines. Again spearheaded by the PAME working group of the Arctic Council, contributions were made by EPPR as well as the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) and Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF). It is stated in the introduction that this new document was informed by the input of a wide range of actors, and thus to some extent represents mutually agreed upon guidelines:

This review and update was greatly assisted by the involvement and comments received from representatives of Arctic, regional and other governments, non-governmental organizations, industry, indigenous people, and the scientific community to provide agreed guidelines for offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic.

While it is doubtful that the views expressed in these guidelines adequately encompass the positions of all interested actors, they do represent a collaborative process resulting in language that was at least acceptable to the consulting parties. Many parts of the text remain exactly the same as in the previous Guidelines. In regards to indigenous knowledge, the section about institutional strengthening and capacity building along with the statements about cooperation with indigenous people for monitoring and observation activities, and the incorporation of traditional knowledge into training programs are word-for-word identical to the 1997 Guidelines. However, there are some changes to and additions of sections

concerning indigenous knowledge in these new Guidelines, an analysis of which provides insight into both the continuities and changes in the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council regime.

First, under the “sources of information for EIA” section that was highlighted in the previous set of guidelines for having omitted IK, “traditional knowledge” is now mentioned in the updated guidelines as a source. This conveys a greater attentiveness on the part of the creators of the text to the knowledge of indigenous peoples as a source of information; although whether this attentiveness stems from growth in the recognition of IK as a legitimate source of information or rather a realization that traditional knowledge needed to be included in this statement as a measure of consistency with the established discourse of the regime is unclear. Other newly added sections give a further, and more specific, indication of the role that indigenous knowledge is envisioned as playing in offshore oil and gas development:

Collection and review of information from publicly available sources and stakeholders is important and continuous through the life of a project. Such information, including vital traditional knowledge can enhance the understanding of the project on all sides, including its social setting, the stakeholder community and the issue and values that are important to those stakeholders (p. 20)

As we have observed before, traditional knowledge is thus tied to the ongoing participation of indigenous peoples in projects, and it is seen as a “vital” element of this process. It is also suggested that bringing traditional knowledge into the process will “enhance understanding”. However, this is explained as happening not through the contribution of useful data or observations but rather because traditional knowledge is seen to embody the perspectives of the stakeholders. On the one hand, this statement accords traditional knowledge a much broader definition than when it is seen as a complementary equivalent to scientific knowledge. On the other hand, it conveys traditional knowledge more as an ontological category, that is a way of understanding the world associated with social reality and values, rather than an epistemological category associated with the idea of truth.

The connection between indigenous knowledge and worldview, and the consequent assertion that the integration of traditional knowledge is necessarily tied to the involvement of indigenous peoples, is reiterated in a later section of the Guidelines declaring that Arctic States should not only “incorporate local and traditional knowledge into the decision-making process”, but also “ensure meaningful participation of indigenous people and other residents

in the decision making process”. However, despite the urgency and importance given to the knowledge of indigenous peoples, there are still areas within the guidelines that belie the apparent limits to the contexts in which it is pertinent. For example, in a section on safety and environmental management IK is omitted even when other types of knowledge are deemed relevant:

...risks should be reduced to a level deemed as low as reasonably practicable, reflecting amongst other factors, local conditions and circumstances, the balance of costs and benefits and the current state of scientific and technical knowledge.

While “local conditions and circumstances” could perhaps be interpreted as encapsulating some of what the current state of indigenous knowledge would contribute to risk evaluation and reduction, it has no explicit connection to integrating an alternative epistemology. Similarly, in the new section called Annex B, which discusses the concepts of “Best Available Techniques (BAT)” and “Best Environmental Practice (BEP)”, indigenous knowledge is not mentioned even when “changes in scientific knowledge and understanding” are recognized as having an influence on the definition of BAT and BEP. While this could be explained in part by the fact that the criteria for BAT and BEP are taken from a different cooperative regime, the Convention for the Protection of the marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR), it still shows the inconsistency with which indigenous knowledge is invoked as significant in seemingly appropriate contexts throughout the Guidelines.

Most recently, in 2009 the Arctic Council again endorsed a newly updated version of Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines. All of the same statements that mentioned traditional knowledge in the 2002 Guidelines are also directly included in the updated 2009 guidelines, but there are also several additional sentences that mention traditional knowledge. In the new and altered sections, we see some of the same changing trends concerning the discourse of indigenous knowledge that were observed in recent Arctic Council Declarations. In the introductory section of the Guidelines, a statement is added acknowledging the increased capacity of indigenous peoples as actors:

At the same time, in many Arctic countries, indigenous people are becoming active participants in oil and gas activities as decision makers, business owners, and employees. Project planning, environmental assessments and regulations should take into account indigenous and traditional knowledge when addressing local concerns and developing ways to mitigate possible environmental damage and negative socioeconomic effects. (p. 9)

Although there is no explicitly stated connection in the above statement between the comment that indigenous people are becoming leaders in the oil and gas industry and the mandate that indigenous and traditional knowledge should be taken into account, their placement sequentially in the same paragraph implies that this is certainly not intended to be a non sequitur. In one sense, the connection drawn seems to suggest that indigenous and traditional knowledge will increasingly be brought to the table as indigenous actors become more prominent in oil and gas activities. Further, the statement could be interpreted as implying that it is becoming an unavoidable necessity for indigenous and traditional knowledge to be incorporated into all aspects of oil and gas activities as more indigenous peoples hold positions from which they have the power to shape and criticize the norms of industry practice.

The increasing focus on the political agency of indigenous peoples as the primary means by which indigenous and traditional knowledge is integrated into oil and gas activities is highlighted in other places in the document as well: “Arctic States should...pursue regulatory and political structures that allow for participation of indigenous people and other local residents in the decision making process as well as the public at large” (p.12). This is further emphasized by the addition of “public hearings and comments” as yet another valid source of information for environmental impact assessment (EIA) purposes. Additionally, in the section on Strategic Environmental Assessment, which is suggested for application in a broader sense than EIA to determine the regional environmental impacts of opening an area to oil and gas development, the Guidelines recommend “that all available regional baseline monitoring information be used, as well as meaningful stakeholder and public involvement, and incorporation of indigenous traditional ecological knowledge” (p. 17). The connection between stakeholder participation and indigenous knowledge is thus clearly solidified in these Guidelines.

The seemingly taken-for-granted usefulness and importance of traditional knowledge that is expressed through the language of these Guidelines has mixed effects on the overall power of the discourse. For example, take the following statement:

“When monitoring biodiversity the best available knowledge, including indigenous and traditional knowledge should be employed. Independent scientific peer review and public input should be used to assure program quality” (p. 14)

Here, indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge are given equal potential to constitute the “best available knowledge” about biodiversity, and are allowed to be evaluated on their own epistemological terms to ensure quality – scientific knowledge through peer review and traditional knowledge through public input. The assertion of equality of these two forms of knowledge through their textual equality therefore suggests that their legitimacy is inherent and that when combined in a biodiversity monitoring program the “best” knowledge can be integrated to ensure a “quality” result. On the one hand, the inherent legitimacy accorded to indigenous knowledge suggests that it is a concept that has gained a certain amount of acceptance and therefore holds some power. On the other hand, the lack of an explicit explanation and justification of why indigenous knowledge should be used gives it little chance for widely successful utilization in actual practice when it comes up against the persistent dominance of scientific knowledge in the field of environmental monitoring. In other words, one must be wary that there is a difference between the discursive power of an idea or concept and its practical power or actual influence on practices.

In the next chapter, I will use the preceding textual analysis as the jumping off point for a more broad discussion of the discourse of indigenous knowledge in both the specific case of the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines, and in the Arctic Council more generally. This will include a review of the relevant social and historical context of this discourse, as well as an analysis of the role of the discourse in this international regime given the discursive formations that have been identified.

CHAPTER 3: Contextual Analysis

In order to fully analyze the discourse of indigenous knowledge according to the methodology of critical discourse analysis, we have to connect the text with a broader discussion about discursive practices within the framework of inquiry as well as the wider social and historical context. This chapter aims to accomplish this through a more general contextual analysis of indigenous knowledge as a discourse in the Arctic Council that builds upon the textual analysis of the AEPS and AC Declarations and the three versions of the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines from the previous chapter. As explained in the introduction, critical discourse analysis especially highlights the dialectical nature of the relationship between discourse and social practice. Specific historical circumstances and social practices, including certain discursive practices, led to both the cohesion of “indigenous knowledge” into a discourse and the integration of this discourse into the Arctic Council. In turn, the existence of this discourse and its central role in the Arctic Council regime has undoubtedly impacted social practices and the further development of discourse. In other words, the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council can be seen as both determined by and determining of social practices and discursive practices within the regime. While the social and historical context that one could explore in connection to the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic council is theoretically unlimited, for the sake of practicality I am only going to focus on certain aspects of the social and historical context that appear to be most pertinent for critical analysis.

In the previous chapter, we saw the discursive features of indigenous knowledge in the AEPS/AC Declarations as well as the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines. What concerns us in this chapter is *how* and *why* this discourse emerged, circulated, and proliferated in the Arctic Council regime, and specifically in the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines. In other words, we must consider both the process and the circumstances through which the discourse of indigenous knowledge was integrated into this regime. I would suggest that it is first informative to understand the general history of indigenous peoples in international politics, the developments of indigenous knowledge in other international regimes, as well as the history of the Arctic Council. Subsequently, I will discuss some particularly relevant features of the Arctic Council regime and the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines in an effort to explain the presence of the discourse of indigenous knowledge.

Historical Framework


Indigenous peoples' recognition in international governance regimes has steadily developed since the mid-twentieth century. The International Labor Organization's Convention 107 from 1957, the *Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-tribal Populations in Independent Countries*, was the first international convention specifically on indigenous peoples. This was replaced in 1989 by ILO Convention 169, *Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries*, which remains a relevant piece of international legislation today (Posey, 2002). In the early 1980s, the World Bank became the first multilateral development agency that created a special policy for the treatment of indigenous peoples in internationally funded development projects, which it revised in 1991 ("Traditional Knowledge and Sustainable Development," 1993). Within the United Nations system, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations was established in 1982 as part of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. This grew into the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, which was officially established in 2000. In 2007 the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the General UN Assembly, and is considered "the most comprehensive statement of the rights of indigenous peoples ever developed" (UNPFII, 2006). As Timtchenko has pointed out, the pattern of increased recognition of indigenous peoples as *objects* of international law in the past several decades has paved the way for their recognition as *subjects* of international law, meaning they have a valid international legal personality wielding law-implementing functions (1996, p. 258).

Along with these general historical developments in the role of indigenous peoples in international institutions, we should look to where the specific discourse of indigenous knowledge first appeared in international governance initiatives. The World Conservation Strategy of 1980 provided a catalyst for initiating international interest in indigenous knowledge systems in particular, and the 1987 Brundtland Report from the United Nations (UN) World Commission on Environment and Development, titled *Our Common Future*, continued this trend by also noting indigenous knowledge (Appiah-Opoku, 2005). Subsequently, the UN Conference on Environment and Development that took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, informally called the Earth Summit, was a major turning point for the discourse of indigenous knowledge. From this conference resulted several important international agreements and declarations. The UN Convention on Biological Diversity

(CBD) was adopted, officially going into force in 1993, and was the first international convention that made reference to indigenous and traditional knowledge. As Whitt points out, despite some disappointment among indigenous peoples regarding the limits of their participation and recognition, this was still a very significant development in the acknowledgement of indigenous knowledge: “What the CBD did was to serve as an effective vehicle for raising and contesting this issue in an international arena” (2009, p. 216). Other notable documents resulting from the Earth Summit, although not formally binding, include the *Rio Declaration on Environment and Development* and *Agenda 21*, both of which asserted the vital role of traditional knowledge in sustainable development.

Many of the above developments were driven by indigenous organizations themselves. The position of indigenous peoples as international political actors has only emerged in the past few decades. Beginning in the 1970s, the contemporary indigenous rights movement developed as indigenous peoples across the world organized conferences and worked with non-governmental organizations to highlight their concerns on the international stage over their tenuous status as unique peoples with special rights (Anaya, 2004, p. 56). At that time, indigenous peoples had minimal representation in political institutions as well as few recognized legal rights (Jull, 1999, p. 13). Underlying the increasing political agency of indigenous groups was a related shift in the understanding of their legal personality in international relations. As indigenous groups began to stress the idea of self-determination as a foundational principle for their involvement in all levels of governance (Anaya, 2004), this supported the emergence of their “legal personality as distinct societies with special collective rights and a distinct role in national and international decisionmaking” (Barsh, 1994, p. 34). While the legal justification for this indigenous internationalism is still very unclear, and is likely to be resolved on a circumstantial basis rather than through legal scholarship and practice consensus, it is nonetheless a noteworthy possibility (Loukacheva, 2009). The insistence on self-determination as the basis for direct representation on an international level does not necessarily challenge the sovereignty of nation-states as most indigenous groups do not demand full independence from the states in which they reside (Lindroth, 2006). However, it may accord indigenous peoples a special status beyond that typically given to minorities (Lindroth, 2006, p. 245), to the point that it has “the potential to influence the way states manage their affairs, and even to reconfigure the usual alignments of nationalism and state sovereignty” (Niezen, 2000, p. 119). Significantly,

Figure 1. Timeline of key events mentioned in text



there seems to be a positive feedback loop between increased recognition of indigenous peoples as both objects and subjects of international law and their increased participation in international institutions.

Regardless of their legal status, the emergent influence of indigenous peoples as international political actors was, and continues to be, an element of the more generally increasing importance of transnational non-state actors (NSAs) in the global system (Haufler, 1993; Risse-Kappen, 1995). With the enormous growth in the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially those operating transnationally, since the 1970s and their prominent activity in the 1990s and 2000s, many international relations scholars have pointed to the increasing influence of a variety of NSAs in the world system as a major change in global politics and governance (Arts, Noortmann, & Reinalda, 2001; Higgott, Underhill, & Bieler, 2000; Jonsson & Tallberg, 2010; Josselin & Wallace, 2001; Milner & Moravcsik, 2009). Non-state actors are acknowledged as able to bring ideas, norms, and discourses to international society, as well as to serve as sources of information and testimony (Keck & Sikkink, 1999). NSAs use the power of their information, ideas, and strategies by engaging in various tactics, including information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics, to alter the context in which states make policies (Keck & Sikkink, 1999). It is also clear that NSAs can mobilize information in strategic ways in order to create new issues and categories in a method that is called framing. These are all tactics that Arctic Indigenous peoples have taken up in their relationship with the AEPS and the Arctic Council, influencing the international Arctic governance regime in certain areas such as the inclusion of indigenous knowledge as a central discourse, that can be directly traced back to their power as non-state actors.

The Arctic as a region was not conceptualized as an area for extensive international cooperation until primarily after the Cold War ended and increasing globalization inspired “new ways and a new scale on which, and awareness with which, individuals and groups relate to the world beyond the conventional categories of nation and state” (Keskitalo, 2007, p. 187). Mikhail Gorbachev’s famous 1987 speech in Murmansk, in which he spoke about the Arctic as a “genuine zone of peace and fruitful cooperation”, is often cited as a vital prompt in the growth of Arctic cooperation. Although there were a number of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral agreements between states concerning specific geographical areas or wildlife management issues throughout the twentieth century (Nuttall, 1998, pp. 27-28), no overarching cooperation mechanism including all eight Arctic states existed until the 1991

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. In terms of the international cooperation of indigenous Arctic Peoples, the Arctic Peoples Conference held in Copenhagen in 1973 was seminal both to the progress of Arctic peoples as actors on the international stage as well as the broader indigenous internationalism movement. Its call for international cooperation, both among indigenous groups and between indigenous groups and nation-states, and its affirmation of the legitimacy of indigenous peoples' goals made it a significant turning point (Jull, 1999, pp. 12-13). Furthermore, The Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), since its inception in 1976, has among many other goals pushed for the rights of Arctic indigenous peoples to participate in any international cooperation schemes in the Arctic region. The ICC also played a large role in the creation of both the AEPS and the Arctic Council (Shadian, 2006).

The AEPS and subsequently the AC were thus created in a political atmosphere receptive both to increased cooperation between nation-states in the Arctic region as well as the mounting recognition of indigenous groups as legitimate international actors. The creation of the category of Permanent Participants for indigenous peoples in this forum logically emerged from the desire of the eight Arctic states to have a comprehensive cooperation scheme involving a diversity of interested actors and from the strong pressure by indigenous groups for increased representation on an international level. Although technically nation-states are still the only "members" of the Arctic Council, and accordingly it is the Foreign Ministers of these states that ultimately authorize Arctic Council documents, Arctic indigenous peoples have a recognized role in cooperation. Furthermore, the emergent discourse of indigenous knowledge in other international institutions undoubtedly influenced AEPS and the AC in adopting this discourse. The Arctic Council's embrace of the discourse of indigenous knowledge thus should be interpreted as an outcome of these historical pressures as opposed to a component of the regime that was organically and inevitably agreed upon by all actors as a vital facet of cooperation or a necessary element in achieving the regime's objectives.

Regime Characteristics

Beyond these historical circumstances, I would also argue that certain aspects of the nature of the Arctic Council as an institution also make it particularly amenable to the discourse of indigenous knowledge. As mentioned in the introduction, the Arctic Council is a legally non-binding international regime. The flexibility of this regime is perhaps one of

the reasons that the indigenous knowledge discourse was able to become so prominent – its basis as a high-level forum in social and political cooperation, but without the traditional hallmarks of legally binding international agreements, have allowed a variety of actors and issues to come to the forefront of cooperation that may not have otherwise (Spector, Sjöstedt, & Zartman, 1994). Moreover, the soft-law approach of the Arctic council allows for indigenous peoples to play a role in international norm-making than would not be afforded by the traditional methods of treaty and customary law (Koivurova & Heinamaki, 2006). However, we must be wary that at the same time the soft law, inclusive nature of the Arctic Council could also mean that its discourse is not taken to be as consequential as that of other more formal cooperative institutions. This is applicable both to the actors within the regime, who have the freedom to support certain discourses without making a binding commitment to their content, as well as the ultimate impact of the regime, which has political and social, but not legal, mechanisms to support the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that are embedded in its discourse.

Given that in the Arctic Council documents analyzed there is no explicit definition of indigenous or traditional knowledge at any point, this suggests that the usage of the terms is referent to some conception of the terms as developed outside of the context of the regime. However, as discussed previously, there is essentially no agreed upon or clear definition for indigenous or traditional knowledge even among the academics that study it. However, I would suggest that this dual-level definitional problem regarding indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council is not exclusively problematic, but also enhances the power of the discourse in some ways. Of course there is real danger to the effectiveness of governance systems when they are based on ideas that are imprecise and poorly understood. In the case of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council, despite being embedded in an affirmative discourse, the ambiguousness of the concept may make it more difficult for participants in the regime to fully embrace the use of indigenous knowledge as a principle and really guide their actions by it in practice. At the same time, the apparent open-endedness of the concept is perhaps what enabled the discourse to permeate the regime in the first place. In a regime, it is often easier for participants to agree on concepts that are “porous”, or in other words ideas that may mean different things to different actors but that they can agree upon “as long as no one becomes too particular about the operational content of the commitments they make” (Young, 1998, p. 48). This seems to be what has happened with the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council.

The specific case of the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines is clearly dependent on the historical context and traits of the Arctic Council in general as outlined above. On the one hand then, it is perhaps not so surprising that the discourse of indigenous knowledge is able to permeate an issue-specific aspect of the regime such as the Guidelines. The projects that are completed by the working groups of the Arctic Council presumably reflect the norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures that are expressed in the highest-level Declarations of the regime. At the same time, I would stress that the presence of the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Guidelines still presents a particularly compelling case study because of the complex, and in many ways unobvious, links between indigenous knowledge and offshore spaces and oil and gas development. An analysis of how the discourse of indigenous knowledge comfortably fits into the regime regulations regarding offshore oil and gas development, as we have seen in the text, can reveal both the regime conceptions about offshore oil and gas development as well provide insight into the role of the discourse of IK itself.

“Offshore” is a space that is different than other jurisdictions within the Arctic Council regime. As Steinberg has argued, ocean-space is often represented by a number of theoretical perspectives as the antithesis of developable, governable, and ordered land:

“the development discourse’s construction of the sea as a space devoid of potential for growth and civilization, the geopolitical discourse’s construction of the sea as external to the territory of political society, and the legal discourse’s construction of the sea as immune to social control and order...” (Steinberg, 2001, p. 35)

Yet, despite these discursive constructions it is clear that in practice the ocean is very much a social space that does fall under the forces of development, geopolitics, and law and “serves a crucial role in the reproduction and development of the world-system” (Steinberg, 2001, p. 24). Therefore, Steinberg asserts that the unique attributes that are constructed for ocean-space in fact intentionally help to serve the functions of the world-system. In other words, as a discursively empty but practically complex space, the ambiguity concerning the status of offshore spaces perhaps allows actors the flexibility to negotiate these spaces in creative ways. Thus, offshore can be variously, and simultaneously, defined as: a space of traditional and contemporary indigenous hunting and traveling, a space where national sovereign territorial rights are applicable under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, an international space (in certain areas), and an exceptional space where conventional politics and governmental regulation do not apply.

I would argue that this flexibility in the socially constructed conception of offshore spaces, combined with the history of oil and gas resource management models, together help to further explain the inclusion of the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Guidelines. In resource development practice in many countries throughout the world, corporations are now required to produce environmental impact assessments (EIA) in order to legally be able to proceed with development. Environmental impact procedures were only established beginning with the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act of the United States, but have since become institutionalized in national and international laws. EIA is a process that both produces information on all potential impacts of a proposed activity, as well as requires public and governmental participation in one form or another (Koivurova, 2002, pp. 131-133). Thus, knowledge about the environment is invoked as a legal requirement in order for resource development to proceed. The coinciding developments of EIA requirements, indigenous political activism, and the widespread affirmation of indigenous knowledge as a valid source of information has inevitably meant that oil and gas corporations in the Arctic have had to find ways to integrate indigenous knowledge into their development plans. Another aspect of the corporate resource management model that we see reflected in the Guidelines is the practice of corporate social responsibility (CSR). While oil and gas companies have ostensibly initiated CSR plans for noble reasons, and may truly achieve social responsibility, ultimately their purpose is to maintain their “social license to operate” (O’Faircheallaigh & Ali, 2008). In the same way, we could say that the strong provisions found in the Guidelines for the inclusion of indigenous knowledge via the participation of indigenous peoples is conceived of more as an enabling, rather than morally imperative, component of offshore oil and gas development.

Overall, the discursive construction of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines is porous and abstract, yet still clearly referent to indigenous participation and authority. I would argue that the positioning of this discourse in the context of a component of the Arctic Council applicable to offshore spaces is representative of the ongoing negotiation of various forces of power within the regime: “the social construction of ocean-space, like that of land-space, is a process by which axes of hierarchy, identity, cooperation, and community are contested, establishing bases for both social domination and social opposition” (Steinberg, 2001, p. 191). For example, through the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Guidelines, we can see the underlying contestation of claims about territoriality, that is - whether nation-states or indigenous peoples are the primary

stakeholders with regard to the development of offshore areas. We also see the tension between the participation of indigenous peoples and recognition of the important place that their knowledge can have in the process of offshore oil and gas development, while at the same time the domination of Western paradigms of development prevails. Thus, it is through the shifting meanings of the discourse of indigenous knowledge that actors in the Arctic Council regime both construct and limit the ways in which indigenous knowledge is relevant, ultimately dictating the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures upon which governance and regulation proceeds.

This chapter has highlighted some of the historical context and regime characteristics surrounding the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the AEPS/AC Declarations and the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines as a means of analysis and explanation. The next chapter will take this discussion a step further by highlighting the practical prospects and limitations of the discourse of indigenous knowledge for various actors in the Arctic Council regime.

CHAPTER 4: Conclusions

While the academic analysis of indigenous knowledge as a discourse in the Arctic Council regime that this thesis has attempted to provide is a valuable endeavor in and of itself, this is not the ultimate goal of this paper. As stated in the introduction, both regime theory and critical discourse analysis are analytical tools that emphasize the pragmatic utility of their findings. Regime theory provides a concept through which we can make sense of behavior in systems of global cooperation, and thus is a useful tool for scholars in investigating and making predictions about governance systems and world politics. Moreover, there is potential pragmatic utility for all types of actors in possessing theories that can explain and guide cooperative behavior in constructive ways. Both indigenous and non-indigenous actors can potentially learn from the conclusions of international regime analyses, such as the perspective on the Arctic Council extended in this thesis, and adjust their behavior accordingly to try to achieve desired outcomes within these regimes. Likewise, critical discourse analysis not only provides a methodology for analyzing discourse, but requires that potential solutions to power inequalities are highlighted through the analysis.

Therefore, we return to the question that I set out to answer: what can various indigenous and non-indigenous actors within the Arctic Council regime take away from the preceding analysis of indigenous knowledge as a discourse? Perhaps the single most important point is that the discourse of indigenous knowledge has an autonomous quality with a power of its own, not necessarily related to the knowledge that the term itself invokes: “It has less to do with the innate qualities or wisdom of particular groups than with the power-laden processes through which knowledge and identity are formulated, communicated and brought to bear at particular conjunctures” (Li, 2000, pp. 142-143). As we have seen, the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the context of an international regime in many ways serves “as an arena where struggles over representation, control, authenticity, property and equity are played out” (Alexiades, 2009, p. 78; see also Shadian, 2009). Given that there are a diversity of agendas that can utilize the concept of indigenous knowledge for their own purposes, the discourse of indigenous knowledge “forms a field of power within which alliances may be formed, struggles waged, claims made and rights asserted (or denied)” (Li, 2000, p. 121). Thus, as a central discourse in the Arctic Council regime, indigenous knowledge holds both prospects for enhancing cooperation, as well as potential limitations for cooperation.

In the previous chapter, the porosity of the concept of indigenous knowledge, along with the flexibility of the Arctic Council regime, was shown to have the appearance of allowing the discourse to be used in a wide variety of contexts for various purposes. On the one hand, this is potentially beneficial in that it enables both the frequency and breadth of the discourse in the regime. For actors looking to use this discourse as a means to furthering certain goals, its pervasiveness and open-endedness is promising. As we saw in the case study of the Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines, the discourse of indigenous knowledge can even be found in a specific issue area of the regime where it might have been expected to be weak or excluded. Thus, the discursive formation of indigenous knowledge allows for its presence even in a strongly international, neoliberal space that is characterized by powerful state interests and relatively little indigenous authority. While this discourse clearly could be used in the empowerment of indigenous peoples within the Arctic Council regime, one must be wary of the other agendas that it might simultaneously serve. For example, it is probable that some actors in the regime support (or at least, do not refute) the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council regime primarily as a tool for avoiding conflict, rather than sincere regard for indigenous knowledge as a contribution to international governance. Some actors may take the position that any participation of indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council is chiefly instrumental – that is, it promotes regime implementation – rather than a right indigenous peoples have as stakeholders in the region (Baviskar, 2000, p. 113). Moreover, it is possible that the inclusion of the discourse of indigenous knowledge is a response to actors with enough political power to compel its endorsement by the regime, rather than a true embrace of an alternative epistemological system. While this is not inherently bad, as the discourse can still accomplish various constructive goals that do not necessarily stem from its underlying value as knowledge, it would suggest that the regime is responsive not to those with the “best” knowledge or greatest stake, but rather those with the greatest political power (McGoodwin, 2006, p. 184).

Even proponents of the fundamental validity and usefulness of indigenous knowledge often have some major problems with the way that it is used as a discourse in non-local and Western created development and governance contexts. First, many would claim that there is a fundamental change that occurs whenever indigenous knowledge is taken out of its particular context. While most definitions of indigenous knowledge point to its rootedness in “the personal, the specific, and the contextual”, its integration into the context of an international regime as an objectivized, generalized concept threatens these aspects of its

agency and efficacy (Ellen & Harris, 2000, p. 20). Moreover, as we have seen, indigenous knowledge in the discourse of the Arctic Council is used as an umbrella concept, which inevitably means that it is simplified and depersonalized. Ellen and Harris eloquently summarize this process:

Thus, in this depleted vision, IK becomes a major concept within development discourse, a convenient abstraction, consisting of bite-sized chunks of information that can be slotted into western paradigms, fragmented, decontextualized, a kind of quick fix, if not a panacea. (Ellen & Harris, 2000, p. 15)

There are costs of reifying a conception of indigenous knowledge that inevitably simplifies and generalizes indigenous knowledge. At its core, the definition of indigenous knowledge includes room for diverse personal experience and myriad ways of knowing. However, as a discourse in the Arctic Council indigenous knowledge is presented as uniform and undifferentiated throughout the region (Nuttall, 1998). Additionally, the integration of indigenous knowledge into a regime ostensibly celebrates the multiplicity of epistemological systems. Yet, in its incantation as an internationalized discourse it actually generalizes the very diversity that it purports to celebrate (Brosius, 2000, p. 309).

Further potential constraints placed upon the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council regime are tied to its connection with the concept of sustainable development. As we saw in both the Declarations and the Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines, the idea of sustainable development was central to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, and continues to have a prominent place in the Arctic Council. The connection between indigenous knowledge and sustainable development is reiterated numerous times throughout the texts. However, sustainable development is very much a Western created concept that happens to have found indigenous knowledge an amenable tool:

The expression of 'indigenous knowledge' through the prism of certain programmes often has more to do with the aims and structures of the programme than with any reservoir of local knowledge. In other words, even where villagers do exercise initiative, it is under terms dictated by the overall framework of targets and activities prescribed by government rules, which in some sense dictates their agency. (Sundar, 2000, p. 97)

Thus, when indigenous knowledge is portrayed as operating in the service of Western programs like sustainable development, its power is potentially undermined in multiple ways. First, these programs often determine what aspects of indigenous knowledge are deemed

relevant, ignoring aspects of IK that do not contribute to the predetermined goals. Moreover, IK may appear to be legitimated, but it is only endorsed under the conditions that it is used to achieve the Western definition of sustainable development. The point here is not to arbitrate on whether the Western concept of sustainable development is a praiseworthy or damaging project. It is to highlight that indigenous perspectives on the definition of “sustainable” and of “development”, as well as their ultimate goals for their communities and for the Arctic as a whole, may not align with this Western program for which their indigenous knowledge is deemed a vital instrument.

Nonetheless, the fact that the discourse of indigenous knowledge as found in the Arctic Council appears to strongly nourish the participation of indigenous peoples in this regime perhaps outweighs many of the limiting aspects of the discourse. The discourse of indigenous knowledge necessitates the direct involvement of indigenous peoples because, as scholars and proponents of indigenous knowledge would assert, the incorporation of indigenous knowledge into management and governance schemes can only be effective if it is documented, evaluated, and used in close collaboration with the communities and individuals that provide it (Butler, 2006, p. 123). As Kalland points out in his work, the endorsement of indigenous knowledge in international regimes holds not just functional effects, but also more intangible social and psychological effects:

This interest has not only given international legitimacy to indigenous perceptions of nature but has also given them the aura of great ecological wisdom, which has presented indigenous peoples with the opportunity to acquire cultural significance and become full members of the ‘global’ village, with important consequences for their self-confidence and identity as peoples. (Kalland, 2000, p. 319)

As Mark Nuttall has similarly asserted, “To regain knowledge, to use it and therefore to regain a sense of competence is to become empowered and to feel that one can become responsible for one’s self and actions” (Nuttall, 1998, p. 167). In a sense, the conception of traditional and local knowledge as a critical tool that indigenous peoples possess and Western institutions need makes the role of indigenous people both “narratable and valuable” (Brosius, 2000, p. 309). Consequently, this positions the participation of indigenous peoples in regimes through the inclusion of their indigenous knowledge not only as a way of acknowledging their unique cultural identity, but also as a clear pathway for their participation, and furthermore agency, in the governance structures of nation-states.

The discourse of indigenous knowledge also creates a space for indigenous political agency. There is widespread consensus that traditional knowledge is closely tied to the indigenous struggle for sovereignty, self-determination, and self-governance (Whitt, 2009, p. 180): “The use of Indigenous knowledge is a political act – it is a claim of Aboriginality, and assertion of land and resource rights, and a demand for management power” (Butler, 2006, p. 119). On the one hand, this is true because of what the endorsement of indigenous knowledge as important implies - that is, a validation of the long-term self-determined resource use, management, and adaptation by indigenous people in an area (Butler, 2006, p. 117), and acknowledgement of the unique cultural heritage and self-identity of indigenous peoples (McGoodwin, 2006, p. 177). As was noted in the report from the Traditional Knowledge and Sustainable Development conference in 1993, it is often argued that “traditional knowledge is related to the entire culture of a people, including its identity and spiritual and religious beliefs” (p. 7). Therefore, the assertion of indigenous knowledge as important to development goes hand in hand with their quest for social justice and recognition of rights (“Traditional Knowledge and Sustainable Development,” 1993, p. 5). In turn, indigenous knowledge has solidified into a discourse that is seen as a concrete and politically acceptable tool through which indigenous peoples can assert their cultural identity (Ellen & Harris, 2000, p. 22), and consequently their claims about sovereignty and self-determination.

As Whitt has pointed out in reference to the Convention on Biological Diversity, the inclusion of the concept of indigenous knowledge “enjoined states to do several things, without specifying how they should proceed in doing so, and this gave indigenous peoples an effective wedge to enter as participants in the process of dialogue and debate surrounding the document” (Whitt, 2009, p. 216). Thus, the indistinctness of the discourse of indigenous knowledge ensures that indigenous peoples not only have a space for participation, but also have a role in the negotiation of exactly what this space is. I would argue that the creation of this particular space for indigenous peoples involvement is potentially beneficial not only for indigenous peoples themselves, but also for nation-state actors as well as for overall fruitful cooperation between indigenous and non-indigenous groups within the regime. While certain key indigenous issues are de facto off limits for discussion within the context of an international regime, for example the question of land rights or of self-determination (Wilson & Øverland, 2007, p. 28), the discourse of indigenous knowledge allows these issues to be

broached through a less confrontational, and thus less threatening, means for promoting discussion and productive actions.

Another benefit that the inclusion of the discourse of indigenous knowledge brings to the Arctic Council regime is that it seems to enhance the overall legitimacy and authority of the regime. Regime legitimacy is defined as justified obedience to a regime connected to the fulfillment of various outputs, outcomes, and impacts of international regimes or of normative requirements in contemporary politics (Breitmeier, 2008, p. 5). There is growing consensus among both policymakers and academics that the participation of non-state actors generally improves the legitimacy of a regime (Breitmeier, 2008). Furthermore, if indigenous peoples see the regime as legitimate there is likely to be a higher degree of compliance (McGoodwin, 2006, p. 182). The cost of disregarding indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council Regime, and thus in a sense undermining an important part of indigenous cultural heritage and self-identity, could potentially be quite high:

Ignoring these might not only severely disrupt customary patterns of work and social organization, but it might also prompt resistance or non-cooperation with the management regime, while locally prompting heightened levels of competition and effort, socioeconomic atomism, anxiety, disaffection, and other social and economic ills. (McGoodwin, 2006, p. 177)

Beyond these social reasons, actors should be motivated to incorporate indigenous knowledge into international Arctic governance regimes when doing so will help avoid conflict as well as decrease potential costs of the functioning of the regime. It is possible that without the inclusion of indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council regime on their own terms (i.e. professed respect for their worldview as demonstrated through the incorporation of indigenous knowledge), they could threaten the regime through protest, disruption, conflict, and potentially even violence (McGoodwin, 2006, p. 187).

Despite this, Nandini Sundar rightly warns in her work that “there is a serious risk of ‘indigenous knowledge’ being used to patronize ‘indigenous people,’ among both devotees of the concept and cynics” (Sundar, 2000, p. 84). On the one hand, as mentioned previously, some scholars would argue that the very label of indigenous or traditional knowledge is constraining and deprecating for what it implies about this knowledge in relation to Western science, and thus is an altogether unproductive approach to this knowledge (Agrawal, 1995, 2009). Moreover, following the work of Foucault, the construction of a division between indigenous and non-indigenous knowledge could be seen as a ‘dividing practice’ in the sense

that it reflects “the ways by which societies objectify the other and privilege the self” (Dove, 2000, p. 235). The seemingly inescapable inferiority that is assigned to indigenous knowledge certainly weakens its power in the context of the Arctic Council regime. Not to mention, “despite the mounting accolades, the attitudes of the scientific community towards IK are still marked by considerable ambiguity, skepticism, contention, and debate” (Zent, 2009, p. 19), signaling that its endorsement in international discourse may not necessarily reflect true public support. In short, while the discourse of indigenous knowledge in many ways aspires to highlight the unique worldview of indigenous peoples and promote its value, it also has the ability to downplay the interaction and contestation of knowledge systems that happens in actuality (Dove, 2000, p. 235), as well as further elide gaps in understanding (Brosius, 2000, p. 309).

We must also remember that while the discourse of indigenous knowledge potentially holds great promise for involving indigenous peoples in the Arctic Council regime in a constructive way, this is not a guarantee: “To the extent that indigenous people or the poor are marginalized by economic and social processes, their knowledge is marginalized, however much it may be celebrated in development rhetoric” (Sundar, 2000, p. 97). The prominent discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council is only one aspect of the overall position of indigenous peoples within the regime, and indeed only one small part of the greater struggle for indigenous rights and equality. Hence, one must be wary that this discourse may shift the focus away from core issues:

“In this and similar cases, the concept of indigenous knowledge glosses what are actually differences in self-interest as differences in knowledge, it glosses what is largely a political challenge to accept indigenous knowledge, authority and rights as a pedagogical challenge to reveal the unstudied indigenous knowledge...The concept overly privileges the power of knowing versus doing and the authority of scientific versus political projects.” (Dove, 2000, p. 236)

There is a further danger in “an uncomplicated and uncritical promotion of Indigenous knowledge as the solution to the global crisis in natural resource use” (Butler, 2006, p. 107).

Although the integration of the discourse of indigenous knowledge into international regimes like the Arctic Council may have both practical and political benefits, it is often accompanied by rhetoric that puts “the burden of sustainability and responsible resource management on the shoulders of Indigenous knowledges” (Butler, 2006, pp. 107-108). Not only does this place an undue weight on indigenous peoples, but it effaces the culpability of the nation-

states who have themselves necessitated the need for sustainable solutions to counterbalance their own irresponsible actions.

Finally, there are hidden power relations underlying the discourse of indigenous knowledge and its supposed incorporation into international regimes of which we should be aware. Caroline Butler astutely points out in her work that the whole project of the integration of indigenous knowledge into Western management systems is in the first place premised upon colonial domination: “The massive disruption of Indigenous resource use that these failing structures have perpetrated is forgotten in the efforts to promote Indigenous knowledge and management systems as the solution to the global crisis” (2006, p. 107). In the same vein, Paul Nadasdy has asserted that the very process of “translating” and “integrating” indigenous knowledge into forms that are compatible with Western institutions takes for granted the existing Aboriginal-state relations, and therefore perpetuates rather than transforms unequal power relations (1999, p. 129). Finally, there is the argument of Purcell and Onjoro, worth reproducing here at some length for its nuance, that the incorporation of indigenous knowledge is fundamentally incommensurable with true parity between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples:

How can indigenous peoples assert their traditional cultural values – which may promote a sort of minimalist, sustainable adjustment with their environment – and achieve economic and political parity with those dominating forces whose guiding values promote maximalist, unsustainable development? Parity, taken at face value, in a globalized world, must involve more equal relations with the local state, as well as with the international industrial order. Furthermore, given the nature of those relations, parity for indigenous peoples is likely to engender their sociocultural shift within the global political-economic hierarchy toward the state and the industrial West, rather than those entities (the West) shifting towards the position of the indigenous peoples. Were this to occur, political, and particularly economic, parity would seem to be counter-productive to the aims of the integration of indigenous knowledge, given the nature of the structure of power relations within states and within the global community. Theoretically, parity would pull indigenous culture toward a Western, less sustainable way of life- against which most indigenous knowledge traditions position themselves. (2002, p. 162)

These are all fundamental power inequalities that relate not just to indigenous knowledge, but also to the larger history of the relations between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. While the integration of indigenous knowledge into governance and development is often

seen as an antidote to this unequal power relationship, and may well be a step in the right direction, it should not be used to elide the underlying structural inequities.

Through the analysis of the discourse of indigenous knowledge in this dissertation we have explored the constructive social and historical context that led to the formulation of this discourse, and seen the progression of the discourse chronologically through parts of the Arctic Council regime. One of the key points to take away is that “a favorable enabling environment is necessary to promote the use of traditional institutions and knowledge” (“Traditional Knowledge and Sustainable Development,” 1993, p. 23). Going forward, actors in the Arctic Council should recognize the importance of this if they wish to continue sticking to the principle of endorsing the incorporation of indigenous knowledge. As we saw in the most recent two Arctic Council Declarations, it seems that indigenous knowledge is now indifferently set on par with scientific knowledge, and they are nonchalantly conceived as equivalent epistemological options for actors to draw upon. In one sense, this signifies a optimistic new era in which the difference between non-indigenous and indigenous, “us” and “them”, seems to be collapsing, in no small part due to the leaps in the social, economic, and political empowerment of indigenous peoples in the international context. However, we should be wary that with this perceived parity also comes the danger that the favorable environment that once allowed the discourse of indigenous knowledge to thrive may be deemed no longer necessary. Whether or not this is a good thing, of course, depends on one’s perspective on whether the benefit of the discourse of indigenous knowledge to the Arctic Council regime outweighs the negatives or limitations. Nevertheless, actors should take into account the implications of the apparent leveling out of favorable conditions for indigenous knowledge.

Moreover, as we have seen, the inclusion of the discourse of indigenous knowledge in the Arctic Council regime is not necessarily related to what is happening in actual practice. To ensure that this rhetoric actually achieves the goals of the participation and cooperation of indigenous peoples, as well as productive use of indigenous knowledge, there are several conditions that should be fulfilled. First, indigenous peoples have to continue to be acknowledged as important, if not primary, stakeholders in the Arctic region and its governance. This both strengthens the need for their representation within the governance regimes, as well as enhances the authority of “indigenous knowledge”. Additionally, as McGoodwin has pointed out in reference to fisheries management, effective incorporation of traditional or local knowledge into regimes has a better chance of success when the

regulations of those regimes are “consistent with local understandings of resource problems or actual local practices” (2006, p. 187). This is achievable by making sure that indigenous people continue to remain centrally involved in the cooperation of the Arctic Council, so that governance and regulatory mechanisms reflect their worldview and experiences. In turn, the discourse of indigenous knowledge is less likely to remain abstract political rhetoric, and more likely to successfully impact practices. Related to this, indigenous peoples’ cooperation in incorporating their traditional knowledge is only likely to be successful if there are clear incentives for their participation in this process and they retain power over where and how indigenous knowledge is used (McGoodwin, 2006, p. 181). Without these conditions, it is possible that indigenous knowledge will retain some of its discursive power, but will not actually induce the regime to draw upon an epistemological basis other than Western science for information and as a guide for action.

Finally, there is the institutional status of the Arctic Council as a non-binding international regime that has thus far allowed for the discourse of indigenous knowledge to flourish. The historical and social conditions that converged in the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the continuation of this cooperation in the Arctic Council, particularly the involvement of Indigenous peoples as “Permanent Participants”, have enabled the discourse of indigenous knowledge. As Wilson and Øverland note, international regimes, when they allow for social cooperation among a variety of actors, fundamentally change the pattern of interaction of influence between indigenous peoples and states (2007, p. 37). As we have seen in the Arctic Council, the discourse of indigenous knowledge seems to be a key crux in the special relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous actors in this regime. However, there are indications that the Arctic Council is moving towards a more formal structure, given that the first legally binding treaty ever produced through the work of the Arctic Council, regarding search and rescue, was recently signed into force by the eight Arctic states in May 2011. It is unclear what impact the apparently increasing formalization of the Arctic Council regime might have on the discourse of indigenous knowledge. On the one hand, it could destabilize some of the key qualities of the Arctic council that allowed for the discourse of indigenous knowledge to thrive. At the same time, it could further entrench the discourse of indigenous knowledge into even stronger, perhaps legally binding, international norms and principles. Either way, the discourse of indigenous knowledge will continue to hold both prospects and limitations for

cooperation, although it is ultimately up to both the indigenous and non-indigenous actors in the regime to either capitalize on or mitigate this discursive power.

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